




A gift from a lady to her medical adviser, even though the former had no inde-
pendent advice, is only voidable; and if, after the relationship has ceased, she
intentionally abides by what she has done, her executors cannot recover the gift
from the medical adviser.
in an action brought by the executors of Mrs. G. to recover a sum of 8001.
alleged by the defendant to have been given by Mrs. G. to him, it was admitted
that at the time the gift was made the defendant was acting as Mrs. G.'s medical
adviser, and that she had no independent advice of any kind. The jury found that
the advance of 8001. was not a loan but a gift; that there was no undue influence
on the defendant's part; that the relation of patient and medical man had come
to an end more than three years before Mrs. G.'s death, and that after that rela-
tionship had come to an end, and any effect produced by it had been removed, she
intentionally abode by what she had done. Held, that the gift was not void but
voidable, and the defendant was entitled to judgment.
APPEAL from the judgment of STEPHEN, J., at the trial.
The action was brought by the executors of the will of Mrs.
Geldard to recover the sum of 8001. from the defendant. The
case was first tried at Durham Summer Assizes 1879, before
STEPHEN, J., and a special jury. A verdict was then given for
the defendant, and the Exchequer Division subsequently dis-
charged a rule nisi for a new trial obtained by the plaintiff. On
appeal, the Court of Appeal, at Westminster, set aside the verdict
and or.iered a new trial, the court suggesting the questions which
might be left to the jury on the second trial. The case was tried t.
second time before STEPHEN, J., and a special jury at the Leeds
Summer Assizes of 1880, when the following facts were proved:
In the year 1871, Mrs. Geldard, as was alleged by the defendant,
gave him two checks for 5001. and 8001. respectively, to enable
him to buy a house. Mrs. Geldard was then living at Gainford,
and the defendant was, and had for some time been, her medical
man. The gift, according to the defendant's evidence, was made
in accordance with the wish of Mrs. Geldard's husband, who bad
died some time previously, and whom the defendant had also
attended for a long period as medical man. The defendant's evi-
dence further was, that he volunteered to pay Mrs. Geldard a life
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annuity of 401., and that he did so from the time of the gift to
himself until her decease, Mrs. Geldard, on several occasions,
signing receipts drawn up by the defendant in the following form:
"Received from Dr. Homfray the sum of 201. for half year's
annuity, in consideration of a free gift of 8001." In 1872 Mrs.
Geldard left Gainford and went to reside at Barnard Castle, about
eight miles distant, and the defendant then ceased to act as her
medical man. She lived at Barnard Castle till her death in July
1876. Itwas admitted at the trial that Mrs. Geldard had no
independent advice of any kind when the gift was made, and that
at that time defendant was acting as her medical adviser.
The following questions were left to the jury by STEPHEN, J.:
1. Was the advance of 8001. a loan, or was it a gift? Ans. " A
gift." 2. If there was a gift, was there undue influence in fact ?
Ans. "No." 3. Did the relation of patient and medical man
between Mrs. Geldard and Dr.' Homfray come to an end when
she went to Barnard Castle in 1872, and did Mrs. Geldard, after
that relationship had been ended, and after any effect produced
by it bad been removed, intentionally abide by what she had
done? Ans. "'Yes." 4. Was the signature of the receipts
obtained from Mrs. Geldard by fraud? Ans. " No."
On these findings STEPHEN, J., directed judgment to be entered
for the defendant.
The plaintiffs now appealed.
Digby Seymour, Q. C., and Chadwyek Hfealey (Forbes, Q. 0.,
with them), for the plaintiffs.
A. Wills, Q. C. (Oanby with him), for the defendant.
The LORD CAINWELLot.-This cause has been argued very
fully; but I myself should have been better satisfied to have dealt
with both facts and Jaw upon this hearing. It seems to me that a
case of this nature, to be dealt with in a satisfactory manner,
ought to present the whole of the facts for the court to form their
opinion upon. But, unfortunately, this case was tried by a jury,
and it comes before us in the only form in which a case that has
been tried by a jury can come before us;- that is to say, we can
hot look behind the findings of that tribunal. That is. a very
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embarrassing state of things, when we have to decide as to the
application of an important principle of equity. I understand
that when this case was before the Court of Appeals on a former
occasion, BRAMWELL, L. J., strongly advised the parties not to go
before a jury. However, the course that he recommended has
not been taken. The case has been twice tried, and it would be a
misfortune if we had to send the case to another jury. Before
determining what the findings of the jury amount to, it is import-
ant to remember how the case came before the jury. This court,
when the case came before it on a former occasion, had directed a
new trial, and thrown out that the questions for the jury were :
[Reads the questions put at the trial with the addition of one as to
independent advice at the time of the gift.] Now, what took place
at the trial was this. The point as to the independent advice was
covered by the admission that Mrs. Geldard bad no independent
advice of any kind when the gift was made. That admission seems
to have been intended to cover both the time of the gift and after-
wards. The other questions were left substantially as had been
suggested by the court; and at the trial neither side asked that
any other question should be left. We have been 'pressed now with
the argument that another question should have been left, namely,
whether this lady was aware that the gift was impeachable ? Now,
it seems to me, that if it was going to be contended that the find-
ings of the jury were useless unless that question was asked, the
question ought to have been suggested to the judge at the trial.
As it was not, we must consider that the parties intended to give
the go-by to that question. So-interpreted, the finding of the jury
as to Mrs. Geldard intentionally abiding by what she had done,
after the relationship of medical man and patient had ended,
becomes of vital importance. I should have preferred an answer
of the jury to the question as to her knowledge that the gift was'
impeachable. But I assume that there was no evidence of absence;
of knowledge on her part. The finding of the jury is that the
relationship of patient and medical mani between Mrs. Geldard
and Dr. Homfray came to an end when she went to Barnard
Castle in 1872, and that, after that and after any effect produced
lVy that relationship had been removed, she intentionally abode by
what she had done. I think that that must be taken to mean
that, even if she had known that the gift was impeachable, she
would still have adhered to it. There is not here a case of express
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confirmation of the gift nor of simple acquiescence in it. But the
gift being voidable and not void, and this lady being the person
to determine whether it should be avoided or not, she determined
not to avoid it. Now, although it is true that she had no inde-
pendent advice when the gift was made, I think that no authority
goes the length of saying that another person after her death
may do that which she determined not to do. The case of
Modes v. Bate, Law Rep., I Oh. Ap. 252, though it goes further
than any other, laying down that wherever there is a confidential
relationship the beneficiary must show not only that there was no
impropriety in the gift, but that the donor had independent advice,
does not go on to say that that is necessary if there is a deliberate
intention to abide by the transaction after the influence has ceased,
and aihy effect prodtuced by the relationship has been entirely
removed. There is not much authority to assist us in arriving at
our decision, which is in favor of not disturbing this judgment;
but there is some. The case of Dent v. Bennett, 4 Myl. & Cr.
269, was a case where the gift was set aside; but I find this
passage in the judgment of the Lord Chancellor (COTTENHAM), at
page 275: "Thdre is an absence of all evidence of the testator
having at any time recognised, or in any manner given any proof
of approval of the agreement, or of any consciousness of its
existence." That does not go far to show what the effects of such
evidence would be ; but at least it shows that it would have been
a very material element in arriving at a decision'in that case. In
the case of Wrght v. Vanderplank, 8 De G., M. & G. 183,
TUnNER, L. J., who delivered the judgment in Rodes v. Bate,
supra, says, at page 146: "A child is presumed to be under the
exercise of parental influence as long as the dominion of the parent
lasts. Whilst that dominion lasts, it lies on the parent main-
taining the gift to disprove the exercise of parental influence, by
showing that the child had independent advice, or in some other
way." I do not lay much stress on that; but I know of no
reason for supposing that the law on this point, as between doctor
and patient, differs from that as between parent and child. The
lord justice continues : "When the parental influence is disproved,
or that influence has ceased, a gift from a-child stands on the same
footing as any other gift; and the question to be determined is,
whether there was a deliberate, unbiased intention on the part of
the child to give it to the parent. Applying these considerations
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to the present case, it is difficult to say that the present action
could have been maintained if the case had rested upon the mere
circumstances which attended the original gift. I think it could
not. I am satisfied that the court would be departing from estab-
lished principles in upholding it. The transaction had its incep-
tion at a period when the minority had just terminated. It was
completed while the parental influence and authority was in full
force, and there was no independent advice given to the daughter.
The transaction, therefore, was impeachable at and after its com-
pletion; and the only question is, whether it has become unim-
peachable by reason of what has subsequently occurred. It has
been argued at the bar that it has not; for that some positive act
was required to make it so, and here no such act has been done.
I am not of opinion that a positive act is necessary to render the
transaction unimpeachable. All that is required is proof of a
fixed, deliberate and unbiased determination that the transaction
should not be impeached. This may be proved either by the lapse
of time during which the transaction has been allowed to stand, or
by other cir.eumstances. Here I have no doubt that there was a
fixed, deliberate and unbiased determination on the part of the
lady that the transaction should not be impeached." No doubt
the fact of the subsequent marriage of the lady who was the donor
in that case, and, indeed, the whole of her life, was consistent with
that judgment. The lord justice continues : "It is stated on the
face of the bill that the daughter had been informed by some of
her friends before her marriage that a fraud had been practiced
on her by the defendant. Now she was plainly a woman of strong
understanding, and capable of transacting business, and it is
impossible to suppose that she, having been told that a fraud had
been practiced on her, should not have been aware that the courts
could relieve her. And if it were possible to uppose this, the
facts of the case exclude the supposition." Therefore, it must
be -taken in that case the donor knew as a fact that the transaction
was impeachable. At the samp time, that case is very near this
one, if we may treat this case as if there had been h finding of the
jury that the donor was indifferent whether she could set aside the
gift or not, so that whether she knew or not would be immaterial:
In, re Holmes's Estate, Woodward v. Rumpage, Bevans's Case,
3 Giff. Ch. Rep. 345-6, Sir JOHN STUART, V. 0., says: "The law
of this court as to gifts by a client to his solicitor, I think, is perfectly
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established. The principle is, that the relation of solicitor and client
is one of such high confidence on the part of the client, that the soli-
citor is considered to have an amount of influence over the mind and
action of his client, which, in the eye of this court, while that influ-
ence remains, makes it almost impossible that the gift can prevail.
The principle of influence vitiates the gift; but the presumption
of influence may be rebutted by circumstances short of the total
dissolution of the relationship of solicitor and client. That rela-
tion is only looked at as creating the influence; and, as soon as
circumstances of evidence are introduced which remove all effect
of the influence, whether the relation subsists or not, if the
influence of that relation is removed, there is no incapacity on
the part of the solicitor to become the object of his client's
bounty, and to be the recipient from his client of a gift which
will be valid at law and in equity." There the vice-chancellor
supposes the relationship of solicitor and client to be still sub-
sisting, but the influence of that relationship to be at an end.
Here not only have the jury found that after the influence of the
relationship of doctor and patient had come to an end the patient
intentionally abode by her gift, but, that she did so after the rela-
tionship itself had, in fact, ceased. I think that the principles
laid down in the cases that I have cited justify us in affirming this
judgment.
BAGGALLAY, L. J., and BRAM WFL, L. J., concurred.
Appeal dismissed.
The principal case brings up the sub-
ject of gifts between persons standing
in confidential relations io each other.
The subject thus presented is such that
it may be interesting and useful to ex-
amine some of the fundamental prin-
ciples which have been established in
this connection.
At common law, a gift from the hus-
band to the wife was void, but in equity
such gifts were valid. If the gift was
not prejudicial to the rights of creditors,
it became her separate estate in equity,
and was supported as such even against
the husband, and without the interven-
tion of a trustee. See Slanning v Style,
3 P. Wins. 338 (1734); Lucas v. Lucas,
1 Atk. 270 (1738) ; M3cLean v. Long-
lands, 5 Yes. 79 (1799) ; Walling.ford
v. Allen, 10 Peters 583 (1836) ; Adars
v. Brack~ett, 5 Met. 285 (1842); Sav-
age v. O'Neil, 44 NT. Y. 298 (1871);
Gill v. Woods, Admr., 81 Il1. 64 (1876);
Davis v. Zimmernan, 40 Mich. 24
(1879) ; Richardson v. Lowry, 67 Mo.
411 (1878) ; Conley v. Bentley, 87
Penn. St. 40 (1878) ; Presch v. Wirtz,
34 N. J. Eq. 124 (1881) ; Wheeler v.
Wheeler, 43 Conn. 507 (1876); David-
son v. Lanier, 51 Ala. 318 (1874).
The gift is her equitable separate
estate, and is not within the influence
and operation of the statutory or con-
stitutional provisions creating a statutory
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separate estate: Helmetag v. FRank, 61
Ala. 69 (1878); A3clMillan v. Teacod,
57 Id. 127 (1876), and cases there
cited. And, though a conveyance from
a stranger to a feae covert, in order to
vest in her a sole and separate estate,
must contain words indicating such an
intention, such words are unnecessary
in a transfer from husband to wife:
Deming v. Williams, 26 Conn. 226
(1857).
In Greenfield's Estate, 24 Penn. St.
232, 240 (1854), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania says: "We know of no
rule of law or morals which will prevent
clergymen from receiving gifts, great or
small, even from their parishioners."
And in the recent case of Audenreid's
Appeal, 89 Id. 114 (1879), the same
court declares that, "There is nothing
in the confidential relation of a medical
adviser to a patient that per se forbids
the acceptance of a gift from his patient."
As between an attorney and his client,
however, the rule seems to have been
different. As early as ihe year 1784,
in Welles v. Aliddleton, I Cox's Ch.
112, 124, we find the lord chancellor
declaring: "In the case of attorneys,
it is perfectly well known that an attor-
ney c dnnot take a gift while the client
is in his hands, nor instead of his bill.
And there would be no bounds t6 the
crushing influence of the power of an
attorney who has the affairs of a man
in his hands if it was not so; but once
extricate him, and it may be other-
wise." And in Af1ontesquieu v. Sandys,
18 Yes. 312 (1811), Lord LDo said:
"An attorney shall not take from his
client a gift or reward while standing
in that relation, the connection between
them subsisting with the influence at-
tending it, though the transaction may
be as righteous as ever was carried
on; the connection must, as in the in-
stance of guardian and ward, be bona
fide dissolved before he can take any-
thing beyond his regular fees." See,
too, R&oof v. Hines, Ca. temp. Talbot
VOL. =XX.-48
111, 116 (1735) ; Bellew v. Russel, 1
Ball&B. 96 (1809); Falknerv. O'Brien,
2 Id. 214 (1812); Lady Ormond v.
Hutchinson, 13 Ves. 47, 51, 52 (1806);
Hylton v. Hltylton, 2 Id. 548, 549 (1754).
Hence, we find the Supreme Court of
Tennessee declaring that, "It is a set-
tled rule, therefore, that, while the rela-
tion of attorney and client exists, the at-
torney stands in such a situation of confi-
dence that he will not bd permitted to
take from his client beyond a fair pro-
fessional demand :" Rose v. Mynatt, 23
Tenn. 36 (1834). In Starr v. Vander-
heyden, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 253 (1812),
the court ruled that a confession of judg-
ment, made by a client in behalf of his
attorney, could not be permitted to stand,
except as a security for fees actually due
for services rendered. See, also, Bibb
v. Smith, 1 Dana (Ky.) 580 (1833),
and Kirby v. Taylor, 6 Johns. Ch.
(N. Y.) 248 (1822). It is to be ob-
served, however, that in the later cases
it seems to be conceded that the attorney
may receive a gift from his client, while
the relation continues to subsist, which,
under certain circumstances, will be
valid both at law and in equity. Such
a concession is made in Bevan's Case,
3 Gifford Ch. 345, 346 (1861), and
cited in the principal case, although the
concession is accompanied with the state-
ment "that it is almost impossible that
the gift can prevail." Similar conces-
sions will be found elsewhere : Jennings
v. MlcConnel, 17 Ill. 148 .(1855).
A -well-defined distinction exists be-
tween the validity of gifts inter vivos and
legacies. The influence which avoids
gifts inter 'vos between persons having
confidential relations will not of neces-
sity avoid legacies between such per-
sons; In Paritt v. Lawless, 2 Prob. &
Div. 462, 469 (1872), Lord PENZANCE
says: "In the case of gifts or other
transactions inter vices, it is considered
by the courts of equity that the natural
influence which such relations as those
in question involve, exerted by those
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who possess it to obtain a benefit for
themselves, is an undue influence. Gifts'
or contracts brought about by it are,
therefore, set aside unless the party
benefited by it can show affirmatively
that the other party to rhe transaction
was placed in such a position as would
enable him to form an absolutely free
and unfettered judgment. The law re-
garding wills is very different from this.
The natural influence of the parent or
guardian over the child, or the husband
over the wife, or the attorney over the
client, may lawfully be exe rted to obtain
a will or legacy, so long as the testator
thoroughly understands wl at he is doing,
and is a free agent. There is nothing
illegal in the parent or husband pressing
his claims on a child or wi-.e, and obtain-
ing a recognition of those claims in a
legacy, provided that the persuasion stop
short of coercion, and thai the volition
of the testator, though biased and im-
pressed by the relation in which he
stands to the legatee, is not overborne
and subjected to the domination of an-
other." And the existence of this dis-
tinction has been recognised in two
recent cases in this country: Grjffith v.
Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 468, 484 (1878),
and Haydock v. Haydock, 34 N. J. Eq.
570, 575 (1881). But this distinction
is itself conditioned; and if it is made
to appear that the testator was of weak
mind, and that a bequest was made to
a -person standing in a 1osition which
enabled the beneficiary to influence the
act, the burden shifts, and the will can-
not be admitted to probate unless the
court is satisfied that the paper presented
actually expresses the true will of the
testator: Haydoak Y. Haydock, supra.
And where a will has been made by a
ward in favor of the guardian, it has
been held that the burden of proof was
on the guardian': Garvin's Admr. v.
W7lliamns, 44 Mo. 465 (1869) ; Meek
v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190; Mforris v. Stokes,
21 Ga. 552 (1857).
In relation to gifts inter vivos, a dis-
tinction is taken between persons occu-
pying confidential relations and those
who do not occupy such relations. In
the latter class of cases it has been said
that the donee must, if the transaction
is questioned, show that the donor knew
and understood what he was doing:
Hogton v. H ghton, 15 Beav. 278, 299
(1852). But in the case of persons
standing in confidential relations to each
other, it is presumed that an undue in-
fluence> has been exerted by the donee
over the donor. And it must be made
to affirmatively appear not "only that the
donor knew and understood what he was
doing, but that no advantage was taken
of the relation of the parties to undulyin-
fluence the donor. According to Rhodes
v. Bate, L. R., 1 Ch. App. 252 (1865),
cited in the principal case, it was "a set-
tled general principle" that "persons
standing in a confidential relation towards
others cannot entitle themselves to hold
benefits which those others may have con-
ferred upon them, unless they can show
to the satisfaction of the court that the
persons by whom the benefits have been
conferred had competent and independent
advice in conferring them." The prin-
cipal case now comes in to determine
that it is not absolutely essential that
there should have been independent
advice, but that the gift may be sus-
tained if, after the confidential relation
has terminated, the donor intentionally
abides by what he has done for a suffi-
cient period of time to show a fixed,
deliberate and unbiased determination
that the gift should not be impeached.
In settling this principle, an important
question is determined, and the prin-
cipal case is acdordingly valuable, and
will hereafter be regarded as a leading
case on this subject. The principle re-
ferred to in Rhodes v. Bates, supra, as
being "settled" that it was essential
that there should have been independent
advice in order to sustain the gift, was
announced at least as early as 1818 in
Griffiths v. Robins, 3 Madd. 191. In
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that case the donor was eighty-four years
old, and nearly blind, so as to be alto-
gether dependent on the kindness and
assistance of others, and especially upon
the kindness of the donees, a niece and
her husband. The court declared the
intervention of a third person necessary,
and, as there had. been no such intQrven-
tion, the deed of gift was ordered to be
delivered up. In Pratt v. Barker, 1
Sim. 1 (1826), a deed- of gift from a
patient to his medical adviser was sus-
tained, a third party having intervened.
The cases are very numerous in which
equity has set aside gifts between per-
sons occupying confidential relations.
In Norton v. Relly, 2 Eden 286 (1764),
Lord NoRTHiNQTOx, on grounds of pub-
lic policy, set aside a deed of gift from a
parishioner to his spiritual adviser., de-
claring that it was the first case of the
kind which had been decided "in any
court 'of judicature in this kingdom."
In NottidgeY. Prince, 2 Giff. 246 (1860),
we have another illustration of the same
principle. In that case the vice-chan-
cellor took occasion to say: "No person
who stands in a relation of spiritual con-
fidence to another, so as to acquire a
habitual influence over his mind, can
accept any gift or benefit from the per-
son who is under the dominion of that
influence, without the danger of having
the gift set aside. If it can be shown
that a sufficient protection has been in-
terposed against the exercise of the influ-
ence, there may be a case to sustain the
gift. But the principle prevails where
there exists a relation which naturally
creates influence over the mind. There-
fore, the doctrine extends to the relation
of attorney and client, of guardian and
ward, of parent and child. But there
does not arise from any of thbse relations
an influence so strong as that of a min-
ister of religion over a person under his
direct spiritual charge." See, also,
Huguenin v. Baseley, 14 Yes. 273
(1807).
In Kirwan v. Cullen, 4 Irish Ch. 322
(1854), the High Court of Chancery in
Ireland sustained a deed of trust made
by a Roman Catholic lady to a Roman
Catholic archbishop. But the archbishop
had never seen her, and denied that she
was under his spiritual influence. Neither
had the gift been obtained at the sugges-
tion of her spiritual adviser.
As between parent and child, the cases
are numerous, and among them reference
may be had to the following: Archer v.
Hudson, 7 Bear. 560 (1844) ; Carpenter
v. Heriot, I Eden 338 (1758); Young
v. Peachy, 2 Atk. 254 (1741); Heron
v. Heron, Id. 160 (1741) ; Cocking v.
Pratt, I Yes. 401 (1749); Bakzerv. Brad-
ley, 2 Sm. & G. 531 (1854) ; Potts v.
Surr, 34 Beav. 543, 555 (1865) ; Whe-
lan v. Whelan, 3 Cow. 587 (1824); Ber-
gen v. Udall, 31 Barb. 9 (1858): High-
berger v. Stijler, 21 'Aid. 339 (1863).
A deed of gift from the parent to the
child stands on a different footing, and
will not be subjected to the same jealous
scrutiny as a similar deed from the child
to the parent. See Howe v. Howe, 99
Mass. 88 (1868) ; Greer v. Greer, 9
Gratt. (Va.) 332 (1852); Moore v.
Moore, 67 Mo. 192 (1877). But where
the relation of parent and child is re-
versed by reason of age, or for some
other cause, and the parent has become
dependent on the child, the rule will be
applied in all its strictness: Mulock v.
hIulocr, 31 N. J. Eq. 394, 602 (1879).
For cases in which gifts between
guardian and ward, made by the latter,
shortly after the relation has been termi-
nated, have been set aside in equity on
grounds of public policy, reference may
be had to the following authorities:
Hatch v. H,[atch, 9 Ves. 292 (1804);
Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Yes. Sr. 547 (1754)
Duke of Hamilton v. Lord Mohun, 1 P.
Wm. 118 (1701) ; Dawson v. Massey,
1 Ball & R. 219 (1809) ; Aylward v.
Kearney, 2 Id. 463 (1814) ; Everift v.
Everitt, L. R., 10 Eq. 405 (1870) ; Say
v. Barnes, 4 S. & R. (Penn.) 112
(1818) ; Elliot v. Elliot, 5 Binn.
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(Penn.) 1 (1812) ; Wills's Appeal, 22
Penn. St. 325, 332 (1853) ; JEberts v.
Eberts, 55 Id. 110 (1867); Gale v.
Wells, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 84; Garvin
v. Williams, 44 Mo. 465 (1869);
Sullivan v. Blackewell, 28 Miss. 737
(1855). And for relief from gifts
bestowed by a patient upon his medi-
cal adviser, reference may be bad to the
following: Dent v. Bennett, 7 Sim. 539
(1835) ; Popham v. Brooke, 5 Rus. 8
(1828) : Gibson v. Russel, 2 Y. & C.
104 (1843) ; Billage v. Southee, 9 Hare
534 (1852); Cadwallader v. West, 48
Mo. 483 (1871). As to cases where
gifts between an attorney and his client
have been set aside, a reference may be
had to the cases already cited upon that
subject,
But the relation of parent and child,
of guardian and ward, of spiritual
adviser and parishioner, of physician
and patient, of attorney and client, are
not the only relations in which undue
influence will be presumed. As Lord
COTTENHAm declared in Dent v. Ben-
nett, 4 My. & Cr. 277 (1839), the re-
lief which equity affords in such cases
"' stands upon a general principle, hp-
plying to all the variety of relations in
which dominion may be exercised by
one person over another." See too
Lyon v. Rome, L. R., 6 Eq. 655 (1868) ;
Haydock v. Haydok., 34 N. Y. Eq.
570, 574. The principle has been ap-
plied as between brother and brother:
Todd v. Grove, 33 Md. 188 (1870);
and sister and sister: Harvey v. Mount,
8 Beav. 439 (1845); and brother and
sister: Boney v. Hollingsworth, 23 Ala.
690, 698 (1853).
A court of equityneverlends'its aid at
the instance of a donee to reform a vol-
untary deed: Turner v. Collins, L. B.,
7 Oh. App. 342 (1871) ; Groves v.
Groves, 3 You. & 3er. 163 (1829);
Lister v. Hodgson, L. R., 4 Eq. Cas.
30 (1867) ; illulock v. lleirock, 31 N. J.
Eq. 594 (1879). It will not enforce
specific performance of a voluntary con-
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tract: Fry Specif. Perf. 70, 71 ; Wad-
hams v. Gay, 73 111. 415 (1874) ; Hoig
v. Adrain College, 83 Id. 267 (1876).
But a mere gift or voluntary agreement,
when once executed, cannot be revoked :
Welsch v. Belleville Savings Bank, 94
Ill. 191 (1879). And the principle was
determined as early as 1682, in Fillers
v. Beaumont, 1 Vern. 100, that where
the donee does not stand in a fiduciary
or confidential relation towards the
donor, equity will not set aside a volun-
tary deed at the suit of the grantor,
however improvident it may have been,
if it was free from the imputation of
fraud, surprise or undue influence. In
that case the lord chancellor declared
that, "If a man will improvidently bind
himself up by a voluntary deed, and not
reserve a liberty to himself by a power of
revocation, this court will not loose the
fetters he bath put upon himself, but he
must lie down under his own folly."
See also the recent case of Wilemin v.
Dunn, 93 111. 511 (1879).
In concluding this note attention is
called to the principle that in order to
make a gift voidable, or such as equity
will set aside, it is not necessary that
the donee should have exerted the undue
influence. It is enough that such influ-
ence was improperly exercised by a third
person. Lord Chief Justice W rIoT
declared in 1757 in Bridgeman v. Green,
Wilmot's Opinions 58, 64, 65, that
"whoever receives it (the gift) must
take it tainted and infected with the
undue influence and imposition of the,
person procuring the gift ; his partition--
ing and cantoning it out amongst his re-
lations and friends, will not purify the
gift and protect it against the equity of
the person imposed upon. Let the hand
receiving it he ever so chaste, yet if it
comes through a corrupt polluted chan-
nel, the obligation of restitution will
follow it." See also Huguenin v.
Baseley, 14 Yes. 273, 288 (1807);
Whelan v. Whelan, 3 Cow. 587 (1824).
Hxry WADE ROGES.
